CALGARY, Alberta — The Transportation Safety Board of Canada today has again called for implementation of a positive train control-type system as it released its accident report on a February 2024 collision of two Canadian Pacific Kansas City trains in British Columbia.
The incident on Feb. 16, 2024, near Greeley, B.C., led to the derailment of four locomotives on a coal train, and four cars of a stationary grain train, resulting in a fire and injury to two crew members. The TSB found that the crew of the coal train, distracted by a radio conversation with a rail traffic controller, did not properly respond to a signal.
The investigation of the incident led the TSB to send two safety advisory letters to Transport Canada. “Both these safety advisory letters highlight the continuing absence of physical fail-safe train controls,” the TSB said in a press release, “ and the absence of effective interim measures to help ensure the success of administrative defences for trains operating under restricting signals.” The agency noted it has made three previously recommendations on this issue, and while Transport Canada and the rail industry have been discussing the issue since 2013, “the work is not sufficiently advanced to indicate when additional physical safety defences will be implemented.”
Crew distraction contributed to collision
According to the investigation report, the collision occurred about 10 p.m. on Feb. 16 on CPKC’s Mountain Subdivision. Loaded coal train No. 301, operating from Golden to Revelstoke, B.C., with 152 cars, had four locomotives at the head end, including two dead-in-tow units, and single distributed-power units midtrain and at the rear. It struck the rear of a stationary 122-car grain train with two head-end locomotives and one mid-train unit. The collision derailed the coal train’s four head-end units, one of which caught fire, as did one of the four derailed grain cars. Approximately 17,500 liters (4,600 gallons) of diesel fuel spilled from the locomotives, some of which burned; about 400 tons of grain also spilled. Both crew members of train 805 were injured, one seriously.
Prior to the collision, the crew had been engaged in a conversation with the rail traffic controller regarding cold-wheel information, which the controller was required to report; that conversation was extended because some incorrect car numbers from wayside detectors were included. The conversation lasted 2 minutes, 50 seconds, during which the train traveled about 1.6 miles.
During this conversation, the train passed a signal displaying a clear-to-stop indication, requiring the train to be prepared to stop at the next signal and to reduce speed to no more than 30 mph. The conductor missed this signal because of the ongoing conversation, while the engineer saw it but did not call it out because of the conductor’s conversation. The TSB determined that the crew “formed an incorrect mental modal that they were still operating on the previous Clear indication rather than the Clear to Stop indication. Consequently, they were not prepared to stop when the tail end of train 301 came into view.”
The grain train came into view when it was about 960 feet away, with the coal train traveling at 32.7 mph. The engineer made an emergency application of the train brakes and increased the dynamic brake application to the maximum, but the coal train was still traveling at 22.7 mph when the collision occurred.
During its investigation, the TSB send a safety advisory letter to Transport Canada suggesting that the regulatory agency work with the rail industry to address the limitations with procedures dealing with operations under restricted signals in CTC territory. It also sent a letter to CPKC suggesting the railroad address its procedures to ensure non-urgent communications with train crews are minimized when crews need to focus on critical tasks, and crews are not compelled to engage in non-urgent tasks at points of restriction.
CPKC subsequently took several actions to address issues with the car-number information that extended the conversation between crew and controller, and added modules to its training program regarding situational awareness for conductors, and respecting signal indications for all crew members.
